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Motivation and Objectives
• Last year's result: Network structure relates to the stability of systems.
-"Congestion and cascades in payment systems" (Fed NY & Sandia) -"The impact of payment topology on operational failures" (Soramäki)
• We concluded our presentation with the following questions for further research -Analyse variance of stress test results across days, banks and scenarios -Focus on determinants of differences
• As a consequence we address four research questions with this presentation: -How does the network structure of ARTIS relate to stability? -Which network indicators are appropriate to capture network structure in the analysis of system stability?
-Do network indicators help to explain contagion effects?
-How does this additional information help to identify the relevant network in ARTIS, i.e. which are the systemically important accounts?
ARTIS -Austrian Realtime Interbank Settlement System
• ARTIS is the Austrian component of TARGET.
• The OeNB is in charge of payment system oversight, hence also ARTIS.
• ARTIS is a straight forward gross settlement system with two special features:
-The stop sending rule as applies to all TARGET systems -Debit authorisation, for regular / daily clearing (i.e. credit card settlements)
• For our current research we use ARTIS transaction data from July 2005 to June 2006 (249 business days, excluding active days which are bank holidays in Austria). • What do we hope to achieve applying RMT?
ARTIS vs FedWire -Gwcc and Gscc
-First, to explore the structure and the behaviour of the payment system participants, as stated in our research questions.
-Second, to identify structurally and / or behaviourally homogenous groups in our data set, that contain information open to economic interpretation.
An application of random matrix theory -First, the data depends on the behaviour of the payment system participants which is unobservable.
-Second, we try to identify data points that cannot be explained by the components. We do so in order to ask the question whether these "outliers" contain valuable information that can be interpreted economically.
-Third, the method allows for exogenous variables which help us to understand how recurring events influence network indicators. 
Structural time series models: results for the entire network Conclusion from the time series analysis
• The explanatory value of the models is rather high.
• The indicators do feature important commonalities.
• But they also feature important differences.
• At the network level the shock that hit one large bank is not picked up at all.
• The selection of the appropriate indicator the of network structure for the purpose of stability analysis is not trivial 
Stress testing ARTIS
• We follow the common practice to simulate one day failures of individual accounts / banks to determine the contagion effects within a payment system.
• To determine systemically relevant banks endogenously (as measured by the contagion they cause), we stress every individual active participant on each day for Q3 2005.
• Based on this identification we stress each of the relevant banks for each day across an entire year.
• We could have continued to use the BoF PSS2 simulator (as we have done in the past), but chose to re-implement the stress testing tool in Matlab.
-The straight forward nature of ARTIS as realtime gross settlement system.
-The institutional particularities of ARTIS not foreseen in the BoF PSS2.
-Our research questions that aim to relate network structure and contagion. Conclusion from stress testing ARTIS
• The exhaustive simulation of stress to individual institutions / banks confirmed previous research that aimed at identifying systemically important banks based on concentration measures (i.e. Herfindahl-Index).
• The most active accounts (in terms of volume and value) are also the accounts that cause most contagion.
• Although with significant variance, contagion effects remain relatively stable across our sample period (i.e. the four systemically most important accounts, are the systemically most important accounts on almost every day).
• The last point may be explained by several "structural breaks" in terms of the size of banks participating in ARTIS.
• This confirms assumptions as well as results from previous ARTIS research. Contagion and network statistics (node level) Conclusions from relating contagion effects and the network structure of ARTIS
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Motivation and Objectives
Network indicators -ARTIS vs. Fedwire Eigenvalue analysis of ARTIS network indicators
Timeseries analysis of ARTIS network indicators
Systemically important accounts and contagion in ARTIS
• ARTIS network statistics on the network level appear to have little explanatory power in terms explaining contagion for the sample period.
• ARTIS network statistics on the node level on the other hand seem to have some explanatory power in terms explaining contagion for the sample period, although much of it seems to relate to value and volume the individual node.
• Moreover, the actual structure of the Austrian banking system and their consequences on bank's ARTIS accounts (and consequently their network statistic) seems to obstruct, rather than add additional information.
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Oest er r eichische Nat ional bank • To complete our ARTIS related research -We plan to conduct a panel data analysis, that explains the variance of the contagion impact across banks and days taking network indicators into account.
-We thereby hope to clarify the open questions that remain after our presentation.
